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LET'S NOT GO CRAZY
I. INTRODUCTION

Stephanie Lenz,' mother and YouTube 2 user, wanted to share her thirteenmonth-old toddler's nascent dance moves with friends and family by posting a
YouTube video of the child dancing to the song "Let's Go Crazy" by Prince
Rogers Nelson, the artist professionally known as Prince.3 The twenty-nine
second video is of poor quality, and the song is audible for only twenty seconds.4
Regardless, Prince, who notoriously attempts to control the use of his material on
the internet,5 sought to remove the video through his label, Universal Music
Corporation.6 Using the notice and takedown provision of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),7 Universal demanded that YouTube remove
Lenz's video from the site due to copyright infringement.8 YouTube complied
and notified Lenz of its actions in response to Universal's request.9 Insisting the
video constituted fair use and was not an infringement, Lenz demanded that
YouTube repost her video."° Approximately six weeks later, YouTube reposted
"Let's Go Crazy #1." Shortly thereafter, Lenz filed suit in the Northern District
of California alleging Universal had misrepresented that there was infringement
in its takedown notice in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 512().'2
On the surface, it would seem that the facts of the LenZ case are commonplace
and reminiscent of many other cases in which copyright owners attempt to curtail
infringement in user-generated content 3 on the internet. There have even been

' Stephanie Lenz is a "mother, wife, writer, and editor." Her two children, Zoe and Holden,
both appear in the video. Second Amended Complaint at 3, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572
F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-03783-JF).
2 YouTube.com allows its users to upload, watch and share user-created video clips. YouTube,
Company History, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
' Second Amended Complaint at 3, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-03783-JF).
4 "Let's Go Crazy #1," http://www.youtube.com/watchv=NlKfJHFWIhQ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2009) (on file with author).
s See Mike Collett-White, Prince to Sue YouTube, eBay Over Music Use, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/artidcle/musicnews/idUSL1364328420070915 (recounting various instances
in which Prince has had content removed from YouTube and eBay).
6 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150,1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Universal
owns
the copyright to "Let's Go Crazy." Id.
7 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1999).
' Len-, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
9 Id
10 Id
I Id.
12 Second Amended Complaint at 7, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-03783-JF).
13 User-generated content is a term used to describe content created by internet users who post
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a few instances in which the recipients of a takedown notice have responded by
suing for misrepresentation under section 512(o. 4 But for the first time, the Lent
court held that copyright owners must evaluate whether the allegedly infringing
material is a fair use of the copyright prior to sending a takedown notice to an
internet service provider. 15 In other words, according to the LenZ court, an
allegation that a copyright owner issued a takedown notice without considering
whether the fair use doctrine applies 6properly states a claim of misrepresentation
under section 512(o of the DMCA.'
This Note argues that requiring copyright holders to engage in a fair use
analysis prior to issuing a takedown notice, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 5 512, creates
an improper burden on copyright owners to discharge what would be an
affirmative defense in a potential infringement action. Such a requirement is
inconsistent with the overall structure and purpose of the DMCA and in direct
conflict with the rules of federal pleading. Given the difficulty in ascertaining
whether a potentially infringing use is a fair use of a copyrighted work, requiring
copyright holders to make such a determination under penalty of perjury will have
a chilling effect on copyright holders asserting their rights for fear of exposing
themselves to liability. Such a chilling effect is potentially damaging to the
creation of original works and their dissemination via the internet. In mandating
that a fair use analysis be undertaken prior to asserting one's right as a copyright
holder, Len.Z shifts the balance too far in favor of internet users at the expense of
copyright protection. Therefore, the Lent decision should be overruled.
The relevance of this topic cannot be overstated. The attempt to balance the
individual right to free speech against the preservation of copyright protection has
become particularly salient given the ease with which digital copyrighted works can
be integrated into user-generated content. While an exhaustive list of instances in
which the internet users' rights have faced copyright challenges is outside the
scope of this Note, it will suffice to say that in addition to private citizens like
Stephanie Lenz, public figures, like presidential candidates, and organizations, like

their media online. William S. Coats, Jeremiah J. Burke & White & Case LLP, From Star Wars to
Second Life: User Generated Content and Copyright Law in the Entertainment Indushy, in 14TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 15,19 (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 947, 2008).
" See, e.g., Complaint at 4, MoveOn.org Civic Action v. Viacom Int'l., No. 3:07-CV-01657 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/viacom-v-moveonorg-andbrave-new-films (asserting plaintiffs' video parody was so clearly fair use that defendant's takedown
notice could not have been made in good faith); Complaint at 4, Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07 2478 BZ) (asserting defendants did not act with "reasonable care or
diligence" and therefore did not act in good faith when requesting the takedown notice).
's L/nt 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55.
16 Id.
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film production companies, have felt the effects of copyright protection on their
speech.7
Part II of this Note will provide the necessary background for the evaluation
of the Len z decision through a discussion of the DMCA and an explanation of the
fair use doctrine. The DMCA and fair use discussions, along with a canvassing
of the relevant case law prior to the Len z decision, will establish a framework for
analysis in Part III. Part III will analyze the Len.Z decision in light of the DMCA's
statutory structure, the fair use doctrine, and the pleading standards of the Federal
Rules. Part IV will conclude by arguing that the Lenz decision should be
overruled.
II. BACKGROUND

In order to properly contextualize and evaluate the LenZ holding, this Part
provides a background to the court's decision. A brief overview of the pleading
requirements of an infringement cause of action followed by a discussion of the
DMCA and the fair use doctrine will provide the necessary statutory base. Finally,
an overview of the prior case law and detailed recount of the LenZ holding will
provide the relevant precedent to complete the evaluative framework.
A. FEDERAL PLEADING AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS

The pleading requirements for an infringement action help demonstrate the
assertion that the LenZ decision threatens to disrupt the pleading burden allocation
between parties. A party alleging infringement need only set out the necessary
elements of the cause of action."8 Fair use considerations should only arise after
the party alleging infringement sets out the necessary elements and asserts fair use
as an affirmative defense. 9

" See, e.g., Sarah Lai Stirland, StiJkdby Copynigbt,McCainAsks YouTube to ConsiderFairUse, WIRED,
Oct. 14,2008, http://www.wired.com/threadevel/2008/10/stifled-by-copy/ (commenting on the
McCain campaign's reaction after several ads were either removed from YouTube via the takedown
process, or revised because of unauthorized use of television debate footage or pop songs); Sarah Lai
Stirland, YouTube to Mcain:You Made YourDMCA Bed,Lie in It, WIRED, Oct. 15,2008, http://www.
wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/youtube-to-mcca/ (commenting on YouTube's DMCA responses
to McCain campaign's attacks on its removal policy); see also Matt Williams, The Truth and the
'Truthiness" About Knowing Material Misrepresentalions,9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (discussing
YouTube's removal of MoveOn.org and Brave New Films' "spoof political attack ad video"
containing clips of Comedy Central's The ColbertReport at the request of Viacom).
Is See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
19 See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
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1. Rule 8 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure. District courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement actions.2 ° The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are the procedural rules for civil actions in district courts.2' Rule 8
of the Federal Rules sets out the federal pleading requirements. 22 In order to
properly state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.'
Rule 8 specifies that a party responding to a pleading must "(A) state in short and
plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and (B) admit or deny the
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party."'2 4
As the structure of Rule 8 indicates, all that is required of a plaintiff in a
copyright infringement action is to give a "short and plain statement" of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.2 ' A plaintiff need not overcome an
affirmative defense in the complaint; rather, it is the plaintiffs burden "only to set
forth enough factual detail to generate a plausible claim that their exclusive
rights . . . were violated." 6 It is then up to the responding party to state any
defenses to the claims alleged against it.27 Thus, in response to a copyright
infringement cause of action, the alleged infringing party must assert any
29
defenses,28 including affirmative defenses, which encompass fair use.
2. Pleading Copyright Infringement. In a copyright infringement action, the
plaintiff must first generally prove that she owns a valid, registered copyright and
that the work is original, creative, and copyrightable subject matter.' Next, the
- 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
21

FED. R. Crv. P. 1.

22 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)-(b).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
26 Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-27, No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 WL 222283, at *5 (D. Me. Jan. 25,

2008).
2' FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b).
28

Id.

Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating fair use
is an affirmative defense); see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing fair use as an affirmative defense).
30 M ELAINE BUCCIERI, 9 CAUSES OF AcTION 2d 45, S 4 (2008).
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plaintiff must prove the defendant has "wrongfully exercised one or more of the
six exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner."'" Under the Copyright Act,
the six exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright owner are the rights:
(1)to reproduce the copyrighted work... ; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies...
of the copyrighted work to the public... ; (4) ...to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; (5) ...to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) ...to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.32
B. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF

1998

1. The Purpose of the DMCA and Section 512. The express purpose of the
DMCA is "to facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of
electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in
the digital age." 33 Enacted in part to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty,-" Tide I of the DMCA addresses the concern of copyright
owners that allowing their works to be easily accessible on the internet would
subject them to massive piracy given "the ease with which digital works can be
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously."3 Because digital
content is so easy to generate, the potential for copyright violation is enormous.
Thus, Title I of the DMCA "protects the rights of proprietors whose works are
exploited over the Internet, by strengthening the protections enjoyed by copyright
36
owners through barring certain anti-circumvention techniques and devices.,
While Tide I protects copyright owners, internet service providers (ISPs) need
safeguards against suits brought by copyright owners in response to an ISP's
unknowing or innocent facilitation of infringing transmissions. 3' David Nimmer,
a leading copyright scholar and professor, explains, "having a profusion of
copyrighted works available [as contemplated by Tide I]will not serve anyone's
interest if the Internet's backbone and infrastructure are sued out of existence for
involvement in purportedly aiding copyright infringement."3 Thus, Congress

31

Id.

32

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).

31 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
M Id.
31 3 MELvIL B. NIIIMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 12B.01 (2009).

36 Id.
37

Id.

38 Id

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

7

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 10

J. JNTELL PROP.LV

[Vol. 17:147

sought to protect ISPs by creating a series of safe harbors to limit ISP liability in
Title II of the DMCA.39 The fear was that "without clarification of their liability,
service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion
Thus, the "Online Copyright
of the speed and capacity of the Internet."'
Infringement Liability Limitation Act" (OCILLA), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512
(Title II of the DMCA), limits liability of service providers and incentivizes ISPs
to remove infringing material upon notice from copyright owners.4
Section 512(c) specifically concerns the liability of ISPs for "[i]nformation
residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users."'42 In order for an ISP
to be sheltered from liability for copyright infringement under section 512(c), it
must fall within one of the following categories: (i) the ISP initially must be
unaware of infringing activity, (ii) the ISP must be unaware of "facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent," or (iii) upon becoming
aware of such facts, the ISP must act "expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material."'43 In order for the "limitations on liability" established by
section 512 to apply, the service provider must designate "an agent to receive
notifications of claimed infringement" by making the agent's contact information
publicly available through its service."
In addition to clarifying the standards of Liability for online use of creative
materials, Congress wanted to empower copyright owners to remove infringing
material "from the Internet should technological ... measures fail to prevent
infringing activity."'45 The purpose of the Act was to encourage cooperation
between ISPs and copyright owners "to detect and deal with copyright
The
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment."'
following subparts outline the provisions of section 512 that facilitate copyright
holders in asserting their rights and explain the notification and counter
notification procedures.
2. Components of Seefion 512. While aimed at shielding ISPs from liability,
certain components of section 512 affect the conduct of copyright holders as well

39 S.REP. No. 105-190, at 8, 19 (1998).
40 Id.at 8.
41

Williams, supra note 17, at 12-13.

42 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1999).
43 Id.

- Id. § 512(c)(2).
Williams, supra note 17, at 12.
46 3 NIMMER & NuliMER, supra note 35, § 12B.01 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20, 40
(1998)).
45

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss1/10

8

Fortunato: Let's Not Go Crazy: Why Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. Undermines
2009]

LET'S NOT GO CRAZY

as internet subscribers.4'
This subpart describes the relevant portions of
section 512' inorder to provide a framework for evaluating the Lenz decision.

a. The Notification and CounterNotification Procedure.4 9 Under section 512, if

a copyright holder believes certain content infringes upon her copyright and wants
it removed from an internet site, she must send a written communication--called
a notificationS°---to the ISP's designated agent."' As for the substance of the
notification, there are essentially six elements required to provide notice of the
infringement and establish its gravity. 2 First, the notification must contain the
"signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive
right that is allegedly infringed."53 Second, the notification must identify the
"copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed."' Third, the notification must
identify the allegedly infringing material.55 Fourth, the notification must provide
"reasonably sufficient" information "to permit the service provider to contact the
complaining party."" The fifth and sixth notification elements will be addressed
in the following subpart. Upon receipt of a notification, an ISP must either
disable access to or remove the subject material.5 7 The service provider must then
take "reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or
disabled access to the material."" But the subscriber accused of posting infringing
material is not without remedy: the subscriber can serve a counter notification in
response.5 9 Under section 512(g)(3), the allegedly infringing subscriber's written
counter notification to the ISP must include functionally the same elements as the
notification.' Once a service provider has received a proper counter notification,
it must send a copy of the counter notification to the complaining copyright

47See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (listing elements a copyright owner must satisfy when
notifying an ISP of a claimed infringement).
48 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 35, §12B (providing an in-depth discussion of the statutory
structure of 17 U.S.C. § 512).
" The "notice and takedown provision" is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512. See Dudnikov v. MGA
Entm't, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016-17 (D. Colo. 2005) (referring to section 512(c) as the
"notice and takedown provision").
s 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 611 F. Supp. 2d 342,344
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (referring to a notification as a "Take Down notice').
s Seegeneral# 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (explaining ISP's responsibility to have a designated agent
to receive notifications of claimed infringement).
52 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 12B.04[B].
53 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)().
s4Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
ssId § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
6 Id 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
57

3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 12B.07[A].

- 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A).
59 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at 12B.07[B] [2].
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (outlining the requirements of a counter notification).
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holder and "inform[] that person that it will replace the removed material or cease
disabling access to it in 10 business days.""' Next, the service provider must
"replace[] the removed material and cease[] disabling access to it not less than 10,
nor more than 14, business days following receipt of the counter notice," unless
the complaining copyright holder has taken some legal action and so informed the
service provider. 62 The counter notification and "put-back" provisions were
designed to ensure a balance between service providers' incentives to remove
content and users' interest in maintaining access to non-infringing material.63
b. Section 512(c)(3)(A) 's "GoodFaith" Certzfication. In addition to the four
required elements of a notification outlined above, section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) also
requires that the notification contain "[a] statement that the complaining party has
a good faith belief that the use of the material in the manner complained of is not
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law."' In order to enforce the
good faith certification requirement of section 512(c) (3) (A)(v) and prevent abuse
of the takedown process, both the notification and counter notification are subject
to section 512(f), which imposes liability for knowingly misrepresenting material
aspects of the claimed infringement.65 Also, the notification must make "a
statement that the information in the notification is accurate and under penalty of
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of
an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed."'
c. MaterialMisrepresentations.In order to curb abuse of the DMCA's notice
and takedown regime, Congress included section 512(f), which provides an
"expressly limited cause of action for improper infringement notifications."67
Liability is imposed upon the copyright holder's notification if the notification was
a "knowing misrepresentation. 6 1 Under section 512(0:
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material
or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
61 Id. § 512(g)(2)(B),

62Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
63 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at 12B.07[B] [3].

- 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). A federal court first addressed what is meant by a "good faith
belief" in the context of section 512(c) in 2004. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391
F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding the "good faith belief" requirement in
section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses subjective, rather than objective standard); see also discussion
infra Part II.D. 1 (explaining the Rossi holding).
6s 17 U.S.C. § 512(.
66td. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
67 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting
Dudnikov v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017 (D. Colo. 2005)).
68

id
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shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees,
incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or
copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who
is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service
provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or
disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing,
or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to
69

it.

While the legislative reports fail to define "knowingly materially misrepresents,"
Congress' intent can be gleaned from the statutory structure and overall purpose
of the notice and takedown provisions."0 Section 512 creates a general notice and
takedown process to provide copyright owners clear means and guidelines for
removing infringing material, clarifies ISP liability, and allows users to object to
removal of content they believe is noninfringing 1 In order to achieve these goals,
section 512(f) discourages misrepresentation in notifications or counter
notifications by imposing liability and providing for damages."
Thus, for
example, if a copyright holder sends a takedown notification to an ISP claiming
his copyrighted work was used without his consent and in violation of his
copyright, yet knowingly materially misrepresents that the targeted use is an
infringement, a cause of action for misrepresentation would lie against that
copyright holder under section 512(f).
C.

FAIR USE

In addition to the relevant portions of the DMCA, a discussion of the fair use
doctrine is necessary to evaluate the propriety of the LenZ court's analysis. This
subpart will explain the factors set out by the Copyright Act of 1976 to determine
whether a use made of a work is fair, note the character of the fair use defense,
and comment on the current state of the doctrine.

69

17 U.S.C. § 512(o.

ee Williams, supra note 17, at 17 ("Congress aimed to create a notice-and-takedown process
that would facilitate legitimate e-commerce by providing copyright owners with a method by which
to remove infringing material, providing ISPs with limitations on liability and clear guidelines on
what a copyright owner had to do to seek such removal, and providing Internet users with a
mechanism to object to removals when they believe that material they placed online should not have
been removed due to the fact that it is noninfringing.").
71 Id
0

72

17 U.S.C. § 512(o.
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1. The Doctrine's Codfication. Enacted to codify a limitation on the exclusive
rights of copyright holders,73 the fair use provision of the Copyright Act sought
to recognize and preserve the common law doctrine of fair use.14 According to
the legislative history, "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 75 Section 107
states that use of a copyrighted work for purposes including (but not limited to)
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... , scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright."76 The statute then enumerates four factors a court
should consider when evaluating whether the use made of a work is a fair use.
The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.7
78
Ultimately, a fair use determination is "a mixed question of law and fact."
2. Fair Use as an Affirmative Defense. Fair use is an affirmative defense to an
infringement action, and the party asserting it bears the burden of proof.79 In
resisting pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories
of fair use, the drafters structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring
a case-by-case analysis.80 Thus, "it is not the Plaintiffs' pleading burden [in an
infringement action] to set forth allegations that might overcome an affirmative
defense, only to set forth enough factual detail to generate a plausible claim that
their exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution were violated ....
In
other words, in the event a targeted use constitutes fair use, the alleged infringer

7' H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), repintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
74 4 WiLLiA F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:8, at 10-11.
7s H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), r5pintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
76 17 U.S.C. S 107.
"

Id.

78

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).

79 Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. ViewFinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 484 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing

Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998)).
'o H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 37 (1967).
81Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-27, Civ. No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 WL 222283, at *5 (D. Me.
Jan. 25, 2008).
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has the burden of proving fair use, not the copyright holder bringing the
infringement claim.
3. The Inherent Subjectivity of FairUse Determinations. "The doctrine of fair use
has been called. . . 'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.' "82 The
doctrine earns this distinction because of its inherent subjectivity.83 Despite the
four factor balancing test outlined by 17 U.S.C. § 107, "neither the courts nor the
legislature have provided a useful definition of fair use, nor have they devised a
meaningful method for determining which uses are fair."'
The factors are
malleable and easily molded to make a case for or against fair use.8' Further, since
there is no guidance as to how the factors should be weighed against each other,
the deciding judge retains discretion.'
Because of the doctrine's inherent
subjectivity, copyright experts struggle to predict fair use outcomes."7 As the Chief
Counsel for YouTube noted, "No number of lawyers could possibly determine
with a reasonable level of certainty whether all the videos for which we receive
disputed takedown notices qualify as fair-use."88 According to one commentator,
"it is virtually impossible for a copyright owner or a user of a copyrighted material,
or either party's counsel for that matter, to have actual knowledge that a use is fair
prior to litigating the issue."89
Even the United States Supreme Court has had trouble aligning on the
application of the doctrine. 9° All three of the major fair use cases reaching the
82 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (quoting Dellar

v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cit. 1939)).
81 BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

§ 8:1 (Nov. 2007) ("The central concept underlying the doctrine-an assessment of the 'fairness'
of the use in question, based on a balancing of several factors-is inherently subjective.").
4 Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors,93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1485

(2007).
" David Nimmer, 'Fairest of Them All" and OtherFaiy Tales of FairUse, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 287 (2003).
6 3JAYDRATLER,JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAw: COMMERCIAL
CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (IPLCCIP), § 6.01 [8] (2009).

' Pierre N. Leval, Towarda FairUse Standard,103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) ("[W iters,
historians, publishers, and their legal advisors can only guess and pray as to how courts will resolve
copyright disputes [involving a fair use analysis].").
' Letter from Zahavah Levine, Chief Counsel, YouTube, to Trevor Potter, General Counsel,
McCain-Palin 2008 (Oct. 14,2008), available athttp://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/youtu
be-to-mcca.html (explaining that substantive review of every single video and whether it falls in fair
use category is not a viable solution).
9 Williams, supra note 17, at 33.
o See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) (holding
fair use applicable to unauthorized home recording of television programs); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating fair use analysis must always be
tailored to the individual case); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (remanding
for more nuanced analysis of market effect factor to determine whether rap parody of Oh, Prety
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United States Supreme Court were overturned at each prior level of review.9
Further, of the three, two were split opinions. 2 The Court has made clear that the
doctrine does not lend itself to "bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine
it recognizes, calls for a case-by-case analysis." 93 Professor Nimmer, quipped,
"Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair
use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be
the same." 94 Nimmer and others essentially conclude that using the four factors
set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107 to assess whether a particular use is fair is an
inconclusive exercise, and a fair use determination is anything but self-evident.9
Therefore, it is a widely known fact that "fair use determinations are so clouded
'
that no one has [any] sure idea of how they will fare until the matter is litigated."96
As will be further discussed, the burden of the uncertainty surrounding fair use
should not be bome by copyright holders who use the established framework to
target what they believe to be legitimate infringement of their copyrights.
D. SECTION

512(F) CASES BEFORE

LENZ

Prior to the LenZ decision, there were only a handful of federal cases evaluating
claims under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). This Part discusses the relevant cases that form
the basis for misrepresentation claims. The first subsection discusses the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Rossi v. Motion PictureAss'n ofAmerica, which interprets the
"good faith belief' standard of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 7 The second subsection

Woman by 2 Live Crew decreased potential licensing revenue).
" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), revg Universal City
inpart,480 F.
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), affg inpart,rev'g
Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985),
revk 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), revg 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y 1983); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), rrvg Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th
Cir. 1992), revg 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
92 Sony was a 5-4 decision and Harper& Row was a 6-3 decision. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
93 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
" Nimmer, supra note 85, at 280 (concluding that using four factors to determine whether a
particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair use is "largely a fairly tale").
" See, e.g., Nimmer, supranote 85, at 287 (concluding the four factors "are malleable enough to
be crafted to fit either point of view"); Williams, supra note 17, at 33-34 (arguing "there is, quite
simply, no such thing as a 'self-evident fair use' " in part because "it is virtually impossible for a
copyright owner or a user of copyrighted material, or either party's counsel ... ,to have actual
knowledge that a use is fair prior to litigating the issue').
96 3 NIMMER& NIMMER, spra note 35, § 12B.08 n.16.
97 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss1/10

14

Fortunato: Let's Not Go Crazy: Why Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. Undermines
LET'S NOT GO CRAZY

2009]

discusses
Dudnikov Entertainment,Inc. P.MGA and its interpretation and application
9
of Rossi.
1. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America. Rossi defines the "knowing
material misrepresentation" of section 512(f by interpreting the "good faith
belief' requirement of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 99 Rossi involved a tort action
brought by an operator of a website that offered downloadable movies against an
association of movie copyright owners."
a. Rossi's Facts.
Michael Rossi, the owner and operator of
"intemetmovies.com''1
sued the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA)10 2 after receiving notice from his ISP that his website would be shut
down.103 The MPAA, through the DMCA's "notice and takedown procedures,"
had requested that the ISP shut down Mr. Rossi's site."° In response to the ISP's
takedown notice, Mr.Rossi filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii alleging, among other things, "tortious interference with
contractual relations."' 10 5 The district court granted the MPAA's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that "the MPAA 'had more than a sufficient basis
to form the required good faith belief that [Rossi's] site contained infringing
content prior to asking [the ISP] to shut down the site.' ,106
b. Rossi'sHolding. On appeal, Mr. Rossi maintained that the MPAA lacked
sufficient information to form the "good faith belief' required by
section 512(c)(3) (A)(v) that his website was infringing the MPAA's copyrights. 7
Mr. Rossi suggested the "good faith belief' standard should be that the copyright
owner must have conducted a "reasonable investigation into the allegedly
offending website."'' 8 The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting Mr. Rossi's proposed
standard, noted that the overall statutory framework of section 512 supports the
conclusion that the "good faith belief" requirement is a subjective, rather than
objective, standard." 9 The court stated:

9'410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005).
99Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004.
100 Id at 1001-02.
101 Rossi's website allowed its members to download full-length movies. Id at 1002.
102 'The MPAA is a trade association that works to prevent unauthorized copying, transmittal,
or other distribution of the movie studios' motion pictures." Id
103 Id at 1001-02.
104 Id.
105Id.
'o Id (quoting Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047, 1050 (D.
Haw. 2003)).
107 Id at 1003.

108Id
109 Id.at

1005.
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Juxtaposing the "good faith" proviso of the DMCA with the
"knowing misrepresentation" provision of that same statute reveals
an apparent statutory structure that predicated the imposition of
liability upon copyright owners only for knowing misrepresentations
regarding allegedly infringing websites. Measuring compliance with
a lesser "objective reasonableness" standard would be inconsistent
with Congress's apparent intent that the statute protect potential
°
violators from subjeclively improper actions by copyright owners."
In light of its interpretation of the statutory framework, the court concluded that
Mr. Rossi failed to assert a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive
summary judgment."
c. Rossi's Implications. Rossi stands for the proposition that "the 'good faith
belief' requirement of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses a subjective, rather
than objective, standard of conduct."'" 2 Further, regarding section 512(0's
knowing material misrepresentation standard, Rossi holds that " 'knowingly'
requires 'actual knowledge' and that even 'unreasonable' actions on the part of
copyright owners do not create potential liability under section 512(f) so long as
copyright owners do not engage in 'subjectively improper action.' "1" Thus,
practically speaking, under Rossi, even if allegedly infringing activity or content is
later determined by a court to be a fair use and the copyright holder had submitted
a takedown notice, the copyright owner would not have violated section 512(o
unless she had both actual knowledge that the use was fair and acted improperly
by sending the takedown notice.1 4
2. Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. In Dudnikov, the court applied
Rossi's analysis to a claim brought by intemet users under section 512(o of the
DMCA." 5 The plaintiff internet users claimed the defendant copyright holders
made a knowing material misrepresentation that the subject activity was
infringing." 6 Citing Rossi, the court granted the copyright holders' motion to
dismiss, noting that as long as the copyright holder acted with a good faith belief
that infringement was occurring, there is no cause of action under
section 512(f)." 7

110 Id.

...Id. at 1005-06.
112 Id. at 1007.
Wiiams, supra note 17, at 29.
Id at 34.
115410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1011-12
13

114

(D. Colo. 2005).

116Id at 1012.
117

I
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a. Dudnikov's Facts. The plaintiffs were a wife and husband who operated
a home-based business selling items on eBay."8 One of the plaintiffs' online
auction listings was terminated after the defendant, MGA Entertainment, sent a
takedown notice stating the plaintiffs were infringing MGA's copyright by listing
a Bratz fleece hat for sale. MGA is the owner of all rights to the Bratz characters
and merchandise and the plaintiffs were not licensed to sell such items." 9
b. Dudnikov's Holding. The magistrate court applied the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Rossiin evaluating the good faith standard for notification by copyright
owners and concluded that MGA was entitled to terminate plaintiffs' auction of
the fleece hat based on its good faith belief that infringement was occurring.12 In
affirming the magistrate judge's decision to grant MGA's motion for summary
judgment against plaintiffs' section 512() claim, the Colorado District Court
agreed that MGA had shown a sufficient basis to form the required good faith
belief that the plaintiffs' auction infringed MGA's rights and that its actions
complied with the DMCA's notice and takedown requirements.'
In essence, both the Rossi and Dudnikov cases stand for the proposition that to
avoid section 512(f)'s misrepresentation sanction, copyright holders need only
show that they sent a notification to an ISP in good faith and in so doing did not
engage in any subjectively improper action.2"
While section 512(0 misrepresentation claims have been litigated in a few
instances" and are gaining some traction in complaints, 24 prior to Len',, no
reported case has adjudicated the merits of a section 512(o misrepresentation
claim in the context of fair use and the good faith belief certification under

118Id at 1011.
119 Id.

120 Id at 1017.
121

Id at 1013.

1

Seegenera!# Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003-06 (9th Cir. 2004);

Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-18.
12 See, e.g., Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1010; see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding UMG had "subjective good faith belief that
Augusto was infringing its copyrights" sufficient to grant UMG's motion for summary judgment
on Augusto's section 512(0 counterclaim).
124 See Michael Warnecke, DMCA's False Notificaion Provision Gains Traction in Complaints, Case
Law, 12 ELEC. COM.&L. REP. (BNA) 73 (2007) (noting, however, that the section 512(0 claims that
have "gained traction in the courts have involved just the sort of conduct one would expect courts
to find offensive -- namely, claims of infringement untethered to a legitimate copyright interest and
assertions of ownership that are inaccurate").
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section 512(c)." zs Thus, the Lenz court engages in an analysis of fair use as it
relates to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) that has heretofore not been undertaken. 2
E. THE LENZ HOLDING

The Len Z decision addressed the question of "whether 17 U.S.C.
requires a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in
formulating a good faith belief that 'use of the material in the manner complained
of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.' "27 In her
Second Amended Complaint, Lenz alleged that Universal violated 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(o by knowingly misrepresenting that her video infringed Universal's
copyright. 2 She contended that Universal had actual subjective knowledge of the
contents of the video and acted in bad faith by sending the takedown notice
despite knowing the material was noninfringing 2 9 Universal filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting that Lenz failed to plead facts making it plausible to believe
Universal actually knew it was misrepresenting infringement when it sent its
notice.330 In opposing Universal's motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim,
Lenz argued that absent a consideration of all authorized uses, a copyright holder
cannot make a good faith representation that a use is infringing.' Fair use, Lenz
contended, "is an authorized use of copyrighted material."' 32
In light of these arguments, the District Court for the Northern District of
California was faced with the question of whether fair use qualifies as a use
"authorized by . . . law' ' 133 as contemplated by the DCMA.13
The court
acknowledged that the question of "[w]hether fair use qualifies as a use 'authorized
by law' in connection with a takedown notice pursuant to the DMCA appears to

§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v)

125In February 2008, District Court for the Northern District of California came close to
adjudicating the merits of a section 512(o claim involving fair use of a copyrighted work, but the
case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
126 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("Though it has
been discussed in several other actions no published case actually has adjudicated the merits of the
issue.').
127 Id.
128 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 7.
129 Id.

130 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(B)(6); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 6-7,
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-03783-JF).
131Len:, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
132 Id.

13317 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (1999).
134 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
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be an issue of first impression."' 35 A finding that fair use qualifies as a use
authorized by law would result in requiring copyright holders to evaluate whether
a particular use is fair prior to sending a takedown notice in compliance with
section 512's good faith obligation. Before Lenz, however, no court has had to
reach the merits of whether section 512 requires a fair use analysis. 36
Universal's arguments against requiring consideration of fair use for making
a certification in good faith were threefold. First, Universal contended that fair
use is an "excused infringement," not a "use authorized by the copyright owner
or by the law."' 37 According to Universal, a finding of fair use implies there was
first an infringing use.' 38 Thus, Universal argued, Lenz's assertion that her use was
a fair use legitimizes Universal's contention that her use was infringing. 39 Second,
Universal pointed out that section 512(c)(3)(A) neither mentions fair use nor
requires a good faith belief that a given use is not fair use." 4 As Universal
contended in its reply brief supporting the motion to dismiss, "[n]othing in the
DMCA . . . requires the sender of a takedown notice to make an ex ante
determination whether a use would be deemed to be 'fair,' much less to make a
representation about that determination under penalty of perjury.''
Finally,
Universal argued that even if a copyright owner had a duty to evaluate whether the
allegedly infringing use is fair, "any such duty would arise only after a copyright
owner receives a counter-notice and considers filing suit."' 42
To resolve the issue, the court first examined the plain meaning of "authorized
by law" as provided by the DMCA and found its meaning unambiguous.' 43 The
court stated, "[a]n activity or behavior 'authorized by law' is one permitted by law
or not contrary to law."'"
Despite the court's own acknowledgments that
Congress failed to explicitly mention fair use in the DMCA and that fair use
merely excuses infringement, the court nonetheless reasoned that fair use still falls
within the meaning of use "authorized by law" because fair use of a copyrighted
work is not infringement. 145 Having concluded that fair use qualifies as a "use
authorized by law," the court held the "good faith belief' requirement of 17

135

id

13

Id.

137

id

138Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 1,Len75 572
F. Supp. 2d 1150 (No. C 07-03783-JF).
139 Id
140 Lenm, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.

141Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra
note 138, at 4.
142Len,- 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145

Id
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U.S.C. 5 512(c) (3) (A)(v) for issuing a takedown notice requires copyright holders
to contemplate whether the use at issue falls within the fair use exception to the
Copyright Act."4 The court held that "an allegation that a copyright owner acted
in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair
use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to
Section 512(f) of the DMCA." 14" According to the court, this interpretation
"furthers both the purposes of the DMCA itself and copyright law in general"
because the decision best strikes a balance between ensuring rapid response to
potential infringement and users' "legitimate interests in not having material
removed without recourse." 1" Further, the court noted that requiring copyright
owners to consider fair use before sending a takedown notice will help" 'ensure[]
that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve' . . . without
compromising ... 'the fruit of American creative genius.' ,,149 In light of the
foregoing, the court denied Universal's motion to dismiss and concluded that
Lenz stated a claim under section 512(f) of the DMCA.1'
III. ANALYSIS
Although seemingly a victory for internet users, the effect of the Len Z v.
UniversalMusicCorp. holding is pernicious. Despite the Lenz court's statement to
the contrary, requiring copyright holders to engage in a fair use analysis prior to
issuing a takedown notification subverts the overall structure and purpose of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and largely serves to dismantle the notice and
takedown regime implemented by Congress. Lent is also inconsistent with
established case law interpreting the "good faith belief' certification requirement.
Further, requiring a fair use analysis by the copyright holder is in direct conflict
with the federal rules of pleading because it imposes a burden on copyright
holders that they would not be required to bear in pleading an infringement cause
of action. Finally, in addition to subverting the structure and purpose of the
DMCA, contravening established case law, and contradicting the federal pleading
rules, Len's requirement that copyright holders engage in a fair use analysis prior
to sending a takedown notice will have a chilling effect on copyright holders
asserting their rights via the notice and takedown process. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding fair use, copyright holders will be disinclined to send
takedown notices for fear of exposing themselves to liability for misrepresentation.

146 Id

Id at
4 Id. at
149 Id. at
150 Id. at
147

1154-55.
1155 (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998)).
1156 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998)).
1157.
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Such a chilling effect discourages the creation of original works and their
promulgation via the internet. Thus, in mandating that a fair use analysis be
undertaken prior to asserting one's rights as a copyright holder, the LenZ decision
shifts the balance too far in favor of internet users at the expense of copyright
protection. Therefore, the Len Z decision should be overruled.
A. LENZ IS INCONSISTENT WITH AND SUBVERTS THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE
OF THE DMCA

The legislative history and statutory structure of the DMCA indicate that
Congress intended to curb abuse of the notice and takedown process without
simultaneously discouraging parties from using it.' Rather than disincentivizing
the use of the notice and takedown process by facilitating frivolous lawsuits
pursuant to section 512(o, Congress sought to achieve a regime in which ISPs,
copyright holders, and internet users would work together to address and remedy
instances of infringement without resorting to litigation.5 2 Thus, the procedures
outlined by section 512(c) establish a process designed to resolve potential
infringement disputes outside the realm of the courts by empowering copyright
holders to achieve removal of what they believe is infringing content while
subsequently protecting internet users' right to freely post content. Internet users
need not resort to section 512(0 to remedy what they believe is an improper
removal of their content. Instead, the DMCA provides a mechanism through
which users may compel ISPs to repost their material after receiving a notification
of infringement."5 3 As noted previously, internet users who believe their uses are
noninfringing-for reasons of fair use or otherwise-can serve a counter
notification in response to a copyright owner's notification of claimed
infringement." The existence of the counter notification and ability to compel
the ISP to repost user content indicate that section 512(0 need not be utilized
absent manifestly egregious conduct. 55 Allowing a user to assert a cause of action

151 See supra Part II.B.2.c (explaining section 512(0 was intended to be a very limited cause of

action); Williams, supra note 17, at 9 (discussing how "Congress did not intend for § 512(0 to deter
copyright owners or internet users from asserting their rights").
112 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998) (stating "Title II [of the DMCA] preserves strong
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment'); see also supra Part II.B.2.a
(discussing how the notice and counter notice process provides a vehicle through which copyright
holders and internet users can assert their rights in lieu of litigation).
153See supraPartIl.B.2.a (detailing the DMCA's notification and counter notification procedure).
154

See supra Part II.B.2.a.

15

See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the counter notification process and its function as a remedy

for internet users who believe their content was improperly removed).
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under section 512(o simply because the copyright holder failed to take fair use
into account is contrary to the overall structure and purpose of the DMCA.
While misrepresentation claims are already becoming more prevalent,"s6 LenZ
solidifies the acceptability of section 512(o claims based on fair use, thereby
undermining the DMCA's efficacy. Encouraging misrepresentation claims based
on fair use is a "recipe for dismantling the notice-and-takedown/putback process
[of the DMCA]."57 The Lent decision is a giant step towards dismantling the
DMCA because it expressly authorizes-indeed encourages-internet users to
bring misrepresentation claims rather than utilizing the putback process when they
believe their content makes fair use of a copyrighted work after receiving a
takedown notification. The Lent court's encouragement of circumventing the
putback process by validating litigation in this context comes at no small price:
litigation erodes the very framework of the DMCA and subverts the statute's
overall purpose. Indeed, it is the DMCA that is largely responsible for the
tremendous growth of the internet, a thriving environment for blogs, search
engines, e-commerce sites, video portals, and social-networking platforms."s The
importance of the DMCA "is a rare point of agreement between civil liberties
groups and the entertainment industry."' 59 Erosion, dismantlement, or both,
would not only stifle further internet growth but would likely undo the great
strides made since the DMCA's enactment.
B. LENZ DEPARTS FROM ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT

Not only does the Len.Z holding offend the statutory structure and stated
purpose of the DMCA, as well as threaten further internet innovation; LenZ also
goes against established precedent by permitting a cause of action for
misrepresentation in the context of fair use. According to one commentator, the
Rossiholding suggests that "a copyright owner cannot violate the knowing material
misrepresentation standard of section 512(o even if activity that the copyright
owner maintained was infringing in a takedown notice is subsequently determined
to be fair by a court. ' ' 6" In other words, Rossi permits a copyright owner to

156 See Catherine Rampell, Standing Up to Takedown Notices, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at D01

(stating copyright claims are increasingly being challenged partly "because of backlash among users
and advocacy groups who say copyright holders are abusing the law and wrongfully taking down
content').
157 Williams, supra note 17, at 39.
158 David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the Web, WIRED,
Oct. 27, 2008, availableathttp://www.wired.com/threadevel/2008/10/ten-years-later/ (noting that
the internet and its innovations are largely an outgrowth of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
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properly submit a takedown notice in good faith regardless of whether the use in
question is fair. Lends requirement that copyright holders must consider whether
the use is fair to act in good faith is clearly inconsistent.
C. LENZ DISREGARDS FEDERAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

Fair use is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement action and "is
relevant only after a copyright owner has made out a prima facie case of
infringement.' ' 1 Since a defending party must respond to all claims for relief
against it, including pleading all affirmative defenses, fair use is properly pleaded
by the party defending an infringement cause of action.'62 Further, a plaintiff to
an infringement action need not preempt a defendant's affirmative defense of fair
use in order to state a claim for copyright infringement.'63 However, the LenZ
holding essentially requires copyright holders to utilize a takedown notification to
affirmatively preempt what a potentially infringing user would assert indefense to
a copyright infringement action. Such a requirement imposes an improper burden
on copyright holders.
All that is required of plaintiffs in infringement actions is to give a short and
plain statement setting forth enough factual detail to generate a plausible claim that
their rights were violated; there is no requirement to overcome an affirmative
defense."6 Instead, it is up to the party defending a copyright infringement action
to assert the facts supporting its affirmative defense of fair use.'65 The Len z
holding functionally disrupts the pleading burden allocation by requiring would-be
plaintiffs to an infringement action to make an ex ante determination regarding fair
use, a kind of determination that still gives the United States Supreme Court
pause. 1"
D. LENZ DISRUPTS THE DMCA'S BALANCE

BETWEEN FREE SPEECH AND

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

In addition to subverting the structure and purpose of the DMCA, departing
from established precedent, and contravening the federal rules of pleading, the
Len z holding upsets the balance between protecting creative works and
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in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2554; see also supra
H.R REP. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992), reprinted

text accompanying notes 28-29.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
163 See supra Part II.A.1.
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encouraging free speech on the internet by leaving many copyright holders unable
to protect their copyrighted works from infringement by internet users.
Given the generally acknowledged difficulty in determining whether a
particular use of a copyrighted work is fair,'67 requiring copyright holders to make
that determination under penalty of perjury will render copyright holders less
inclined to assert their rights using the notice and takedown process for fear of
being exposed to misrepresentation claims. This chilling effect on the use of the
notification process will subsequently stifle the promulgation of creative works
produced and disseminated via the internet due to the perceived difficulty of
effectively policing infringement.
Attempting to downplay this effect, the Len.Z court asserts that the impact of
the fair use doctrine is probably exaggerated. 6 According to Len, there will likely
be few cases in which "a copyright owner's determination that a particular use is
not fair use will meet the requisite standard of subjective bad faith required to
prevail in an action for misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(0."' 6 9 Few cases
or not, the Len Z court's argument misses the point. Even assuming the court is
correct in its assertion that few cases will actually meet the threshold of bad faith,
this uncertainty is the crux of the issue: the perceived inability to make a correct
fair use determination ex ante will result in copyright holders declining to assert
their rights via a DMCA notification for fear of being vulnerable to section 512(f)
misrepresentation claims.
In addition to creating a chilling effect on copyright holders asserting their
rights in the digital environment, the court's validation of this cause of action is
also detrimental to the established procedure set out by the DMCA to deal with
potential infringement. Encouraging users to bring suit in hopes of obtaining
damages for misrepresentation in the fair use context rather than using the existing
procedural channels to contest their content's removal effectively subverts the
overall purpose of the DMCA.
Rather than resolving infringement disputes by way of section 512(o, the
DMCA provides "specific notice, take-down, and put-back procedures that
carefully balance the First Amendment rights of users with the rights of a
potentially injured copyright holder."' 70 Although Congress intended to ensure
the costs associated with abuse of the notice and takedown process would be
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borne by abusers, 7 ' Congress did not intend section 512(f) to deter copyright
owners or internet users from asserting their rights. 7 2 As one practitioner states:
[Nothing in § 512(f itself or in the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to create a process in which copyright owners
and Internet users would fear voicing their interests to ISPs due to
a high risk of liability. Imposing liability for takedown or
counternotices aimed at alleged fair use material would create such
1 73

fear.

It is fear, however, that is likely to pervade should the Len Z holding be allowed to
stand. Copyright holders will be rendered powerless to assert their rights.
Although some may argue that copyright holders could simply choose to
enforce their copyrights by bringing suit against the alleged infringer as an
alternative to the DMCA's notice and takedown process, this argument is
problematic for several reasons. First, forcing copyright holders to resort to
remedial litigation would subvert the DMCA's purpose: to facilitate cooperation
between copyright holders, ISPs, and internet users to combat infringement while
simultaneously avoiding litigation. The DMCA is crucial to facilitating the vitality
of the internet, and forcing copyright holders to circumvent the notice and
takedown process by resorting to litigation is counterproductive. A second
problem with forcing copyright holders to resort to litigation to enforce their
copyrights is that litigation will be prohibitively expensive for the average
copyright holder. Thus, when faced with incurring litigation expenses, liability for
misrepresentation, or both, many copyright holders will have no choice but to
forgo asserting their rights and yield to potentially unauthorized uses of their
copyrights via the internet.
IV. CONCLUSION

While seemingly a victory for internet users like Stephanie Lenz, the LenZ
decision unfairly tips the balance in favor of internet users at the expense of not
only copyright holders, but also the internet's continued growth and survival.
Therefore, the next time a court faces the question of whether a claim of
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misrepresentation should be permitted to survive a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the copyright holder neglected to consider fair use, let's not go crazy
and instead grant the copyright holder's motion to dismiss.
Congress, in enacting the DMCA, provided a forum in which disputes over
copyrighted material contained in user-generated internet content could be settled
outside the realm of litigation. The DMCA's notification and counter notification
process provide a vehicle through which internet users and copyright owners can
work together to resolve conflicts. Although section 512(o of the DMCA does
provide recourse to users who feel abused by the notification process, the
misrepresentation cause of action was not intended to be used as a sword against
copyright holders or create a chilling effect on the use of the notification process.
Instead of resorting to litigation, if internet users feel their content was improperly
removed because of fair use or otherwise, the DMCA's counter notification
process provides a remedy; section 512(f claims should be reserved for
particularly egregious conduct. Once the content is restored, the copyright owner
can then decide whether to pursue an infringement action. This process ensures
that copyrights are respected but that free speech is not stifled without recourse.
The DMCA's established framework strikes a proper balance between
protecting copyrighted works and encouraging free speech on the internet. The
Len z decision disrupts this balance by validating and encouraging section 512(0
misrepresentation claims based on a fair use argument by requiring copyright
holders to certify that the targeted work does not make fair use of the copyright.
Because of the practical difficulty in ascertaining ex ante whether a use of a
copyright is considered fair, LenZ effectively renders copyright holders powerless
in asserting their rights for fear of being held liable for misrepresentation.
Section 512 of the DMCA cannot continue to provide protection for copyright
holders, facilitate the free speech of internet users, and contribute to the continued
growth and innovation of the internet if its procedures are undermined by the
encouragement of the use section 512(f) as a means of obtaining recourse. In
order to restore the balance crafted by the drafters of the DMCA between
copyright protection and free speech, the Len Z holding should be overruled.
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